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THE TRUE LENDER DOCTRINE: FUNCTION
OVER FORM AS A REASONABLE
CONSTRAINT ON THE EXPORTATION OF
INTEREST RATES
JOHN HANNON†
ABSTRACT
The exportation doctrine permits national and state banks to export
interest rates that are legal in one state where they operate to any other
state, thereby shielding the banks from liability resulting from state
usury claims. The doctrine has expanded over the last forty years to
permit state and national banks to preempt a variety of state consumerfinancial-protection laws. The doctrine’s high-water mark is the
emergence of the “rent-a-charter” arrangement, a scheme in which a
nonbank lender uses a bank as a mere conduit to originate loans that
are not subject to state usury laws. This Note argues that, at minimum,
nonbank entities should not be allowed the benefit of the doctrine by
temporarily occupying banks for the sole purpose of originating loans
that are immune from state financial consumer protection laws.
A series of courts have recently begun applying a more exacting
standard to these arrangements. Under the “true lender” doctrine,
courts disregard the form of the lending configuration in favor of a
searching examination of its substance, considering a variety of factors
designed to determine which entity is the actual, rather than nominal,
lender. This Note argues that the true lender doctrine’s singular focus
on substance over form, combined with judicial agility to examine each
factual constellation and detect any obfuscating formalities
implemented by rent-a-charter parties, is presently the most effective
way to sensibly limit the reach of the exportation doctrine. And, to the
degree that banks assume more substantive duties in the lending
process and retain some measure of risk in seeking to comply with the
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doctrine, the results are broadly consistent with regulatory approaches
that have been deployed in the wake of the financial crisis.

INTRODUCTION
The exportation doctrine permits national and state banks to
export interest rates that are legal in one state where they operate—
generally a state with very permissive or nonexistent usury laws—to
any other state, thereby shielding the banks from liability resulting
from state usury claims.1 The doctrine began nearly forty years ago,
and originally applied only to the nation’s “most favored lenders”:
nationally chartered banks.2 This once-limited ability of national banks
to evade state usury limits has devolved into a regime in which even
nonchartered, uninsured institutions enjoy the ability to preempt a host
of financial-consumer-protection laws and charge limitless interest
rates3 across the country.4
Commentators have lamented this expansive trajectory, pointing
out that the original rationale for the exportation doctrine—fostering
the development and maintenance of a national banking system—has
long since been exceeded.5 It also appears to have been this
unprincipled extension of the privilege that motivated the Second
Circuit to impose an ill-considered limitation on the exportation
doctrine.6 In May of 2015, the court held in Madden v. Midland
Funding, LLC7 that a third-party nonbank debt collector that had
purchased charged-off8 consumer credit card debts from a nationally
1. For the statutes, judicial decisions, and regulatory interpretations that have created and
shaped the exportation doctrine, see infra Part I.
2. For the origins and development of the “most favored lender” doctrine, see infra Part I.
3. Some states do not impose any interest-rate caps on loans. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §
15-1-1(1) (West 2017) (“The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of
interest . . . .”).
4. See generally Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation
Doctrine and Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518 (2004)
(chronicling the expansion of the exportation doctrine and discussing its implications).
5. See, e.g., id. at 621–22 (arguing that the expansion of the exportation doctrine to
encompass the issuing of tax refund anticipation loans and payday loans by nonbanks “is not
justifiable under the principles of banking law from which [the doctrine] originally derived”
(emphasis in original)).
6. For an examination of the Second Circuit’s motivation in the Madden decision, see infra
Part II.
7. Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
2505 (2016).
8. “A charge-off . . . is debt that is deemed unlikely to be collected by the creditor because
the borrower has become substantially delinquent after a period of time.” Charge-Off,
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chartered bank did not also acquire the originating bank’s ability to
preempt state usury laws with respect to the purchased loans.9 Prior to
the decision, it was generally assumed—and two circuits had broadly
indicated—that the exportation doctrine, like other contractual rights,
passed with the loans to any subsequent assignee.10
The Second Circuit’s ruling has upset the long-settled expectations
of investors who had confidently purchased an array of securities
comprised of instruments whose value was suddenly and unexpectedly
compromised.11 More broadly, Madden injected an element of
uncertainty into the secondary loan market, functionally imposing—at
minimum—new information costs on a process otherwise
characterized by unparalleled efficiency and liquidity.12
The decision prompted a range of critiques, principally from
groups concerned with the decision’s impact on the secondary loan
market.13 Marketplace lenders and associated service industries were
similarly disquieted.14 And, in a joint amicus brief, the Solicitor
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/chargeoff.asp
[http://perma.cc/J84NGQBE].
9. Madden, 786 F.3d at 250.
10. See Krispin v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 218 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2000) (explaining “that
it makes sense to look to the originating entity” to determine whether a loan preempts state usury
claims); FDIC v. Lattimore Land Corp., 656 F.2d 139, 148–49 (5th. Cir. 1981) (“The non-usurious
character of a note should not change when the note changes hands.”).
11. For a discussion of the Madden decision’s impact, see infra Part II.
12. See Michael Marvin, Note, Interest Exportation and Preemption: Madden’s Impact on
National Banks, the Secondary Credit Market, and P2P Lending, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1807, 1838
(2016) (“The process of securitization may bundle borrowers of different risk profiles together,
and therefore even extending credit to the least risky borrowers will entail higher transaction costs
post-Madden when banks try to sell off that debt in a securitization.”). For a discussion of recent
legislative efforts to remedy Madden’s impact, see infra note 87.
13. See, e.g., Kevin Wack, Debt-Sale Ruling Spooks Banks, Marketplace Lenders, AM.
BANKER (July 24, 2015, 2:26 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/marketplacelending/debt-sale-ruling-spooks-banks-marketplace-lenders-1075654-1.html
[http://perma.cc/
94XZ-D25W] (explaining that the ruling induced “a wave of anxiety at law firms, rating agencies
and financial industry trade groups”).
14. “Marketplace lenders are nonbank lenders that rely heavily on online marketing and
underwriting platforms.” OCC NAT’L RISK COMM., SEMIANNUAL RISK PERSPECTIVE (2016),
https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/semiannualrisk-perspective/semiannual-risk-perspective-spring-2016.pdf
[http://perma.cc/DQ46-L9GL].
Although this group of lenders has been relying on relationships with chartered banks in order to
obtain the benefits of preemption, they do not generally fit the mold of an entity seeking to enjoy
the privileges accorded to banks while evading the responsibilities and constraints traditionally
imposed on banks. Moreover, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) has recently
begun the process of granting limited-purpose charters to such lenders, thereby obviating their
use of partnerships with chartered institutions. See generally OCC, EXPLORING SPECIAL
PURPOSE
NATIONAL
BANK
CHARTERS
FOR
FINTECH
COMPANIES
(2016),
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General and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
unequivocally deemed the Second Circuit’s analysis incorrect.15
Notwithstanding widespread discontent from the financial industry
and its manifestation in the form of amici,16 the Supreme Court
declined to hear the case in June of 2016.17
The Madden court, this Note argues, was motivated by a prudent
desire to diminish the scope of the exportation doctrine.
Notwithstanding the court’s reasonable goal, the inhibitory impact that
the court’s blunt approach has exacted on the secondary loan market
is difficult to accept, even in exchange for any progress made in limiting
the reach of the doctrine. However, in a line of cases involving payday
lending, a judicial trend has emerged that is more capable of achieving
the Second Circuit’s goal while avoiding the inefficiencies its ruling has
generated: the “true lender” test.
The true lender test arose in the context of perhaps the most
egregious extension of the ability to preempt state usury laws, wherein
payday lenders and other nonbank entities have periodically obtained
the benefits of the exportation doctrine by utilizing an arrangement
commonly referred to as “rent-a-charter.”18 In this model, a nonbank
entity solicits borrowers, makes all the credit decisions, and directs a
partner bank to originate its loans—only to purchase them from the
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/comments/special-purpose-nationalbank-charters-for-fintech.pdf [http://perma.cc/57BH-7F6F] (exploring whether the OCC should
issue special-purpose bank charters to FinTech companies). Marketplace lenders responded
enthusiastically about assuming increased responsibility and oversight in exchange for gaining
access to the rights of traditional banks. See, e.g., Letter from Richard H. Neiman, Lending Club,
to Thomas J. Curry, OCC, at 2 (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.occ.gov/topics/responsibleinnovation/comments/comment-lending-club.pdf [http://perma.cc/6EDS-4WY9] (“Obtaining a
national bank charter brings responsibilities alongside its privileges, and we fully support the
OCC’s efforts to ensure that applicants for the special purpose charter satisfy standards that
protect the banking system and ensure consumers and businesses are served in a safe, fair, and
responsible manner.”). Because the implications of the judicial developments discussed here on
the continued viability of marketplace lending are very likely to become moot in light of the
OCC’s fast-moving process toward the establishment of a limited national charter for such firms,
this Note will not evaluate its proposals by reference to marketplace lenders.
15. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Midland Funding, LLC v. Madden,
136 S. Ct. 2505 (2016) (No. 15-610). Despite its criticism of the Second Circuit’s decision, the
amicus brief advocated for a denial of the petition for certiorari on grounds that no genuine circuit
split existed. Id.
16. See, e.g., Brief of the Structured Fin. Indus. Grp., Inc. & the Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts.
Ass’n as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Madden, 136 S. Ct. 2505 (No. 15-610).
17. Madden, 136 S. Ct. 2505 (mem.).
18. See, e.g., West Virginia v. CashCall, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 781, 783 (S.D. W. Va. 2009)
(describing a payday lender’s bank partnership as a “‘rent-a-bank’ or ‘rent-a-charter’ scheme
designed to avoid West Virginia usury laws”).
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bank within days. This use of a chartered bank as a conduit to originate
loans thereby confers on the loans the full preemptive shield of the
exportation doctrine. However, a series of courts have recently begun
applying a more exacting level of scrutiny to these arrangements.19
Courts applying the true lender test disregard the form of the lending
configuration in favor of a searching examination of its substance,
considering a variety of factors designed to determine which entity is
the actual lender.20 Only after making that determination will the
courts decide whether the actual lender is entitled to the broad
protections granted to chartered insured21 depository institutions. In
contrast to the inflexible and overbroad approach of the Madden court,
the true lender doctrine looks past the superficial form of rent-acharter arrangements in order to ascertain whether the bank that is
entitled to the preemption of state laws is the real lender receiving such
protection.22
This Note argues that the burgeoning true lender doctrine
represents a judicial mechanism capable of imposing a sensible limit on
the heretofore endless scope of the exportation doctrine, while
avoiding the uncertain market conditions sown by Madden’s approach.
This Note further argues that the impact of the true lender doctrine on
rent-a-charter arrangements is consistent with the regulatory

19. See CFPB v. CashCall, Inc., No. CV 15-7522-JFW (RAOx), 2016 WL 4820635, at *6
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2016) (applying a totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine that the
nonbank entity, not the originating tribal lender, was the true lender); Pennsylvania v. Think Fin.,
Inc., No. 14-cv-7139, 2016 WL 183289, at *18 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2016) (denying a motion to dismiss
in a usury action because plaintiffs had alleged facts sufficient to support an inference that the
nonbank entity was the true lender and did not enjoy the privilege of the exportation doctrine);
CashCall, Inc. v. Morrisey, No. 12-1274, 2014 WL 2404300, at *15 (W. Va. May 30, 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 2050 (2015) (affirming the trial court’s conclusion that the nonbank lender was
the de facto lender and was therefore not entitled to preemption of West Virginia’s usury laws).
20. While the factors being considered are largely similar between cases, courts have been
generally imprecise in labeling the fledgling doctrine, resulting in several denominations in
addition to true lender, such as the de facto lender test and the predominant interest test. See
CFPB, 2016 WL 4820635, at *6 (alternatingly referring to the de facto lender, the predominant
economic interest, and the true lender tests); Morrisey, 2014 WL 2404300, at *14 (referring to
both the true lender and the predominant interest test).
21. Insured Depository Institutions are member banks of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC). Both state and nationally chartered banks may, and functionally must, join
the FDIC. See Schiltz, supra note 4, at 542 n.103 (“[A]s a practical matter, federal deposit
insurance is regarded as a competitive necessity.”).
22. For a discussion of the cases that have developed the substance-over-form approach of
the true lender doctrine, see infra Part III.
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approaches employed by the Dodd-Frank Act (Dodd-Frank)23 and
might complement Dodd Frank’s structural safeguards, which are
designed to promote systemic safety and soundness in an increasingly
interconnected financial landscape.
Part I traces the origin and progression of the exportation
doctrine, explains how the doctrine is in need of a limiting principle,
and details the ways in which expansive determinations of preemption
of state regulation is thought to have contributed to the financial crisis.
Part II reviews Madden’s holding, considers the Second Circuit’s likely
motivation for its ruling, and details the ramifications of the court’s
overly broad principle in areas that may not have been anticipated.
Part III describes the true lender doctrine and advocates for its
enshrinement as a judicial doctrine capable of imposing and policing a
line that precludes undeserving lenders from enjoying the exportation
doctrine’s protection without impeding unintended markets or
upsetting long-settled expectations. Part III also argues that the true
lender doctrine is broadly consistent with, and may help to supplement,
the regulatory approaches employed by Dodd-Frank in the areas of
prudential “safety and soundness” and consumer protection.
I. THE EXPORTATION DOCTRINE AND PREEMPTION OF STATE
CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS
The exportation doctrine grew out of a statutory scheme, and
associated Supreme Court case law, that was primarily intended to
protect a then-nascent national banking system from protectionist
attack by the states. But over the last forty years, the doctrine has
expanded in ways that have no basis in its original rationale. Notably,
the exportation doctrine has been extended to allow undeserving
nonbank lenders to originate loans through banks in order to evade
interest-rate caps. This and related expansions have protected an array
of actors from state interest-rate limitations and other consumerprotection laws that contributed, in part, to the financial crisis.
Recognizing this relationship, Congress and the Supreme Court have
recently acted to halt or reverse these expansive preemption trends in
the area of financial-services regulation. This Part details the historical
trajectory of the exportation doctrine, from its creation and subsequent
expansion through the recent laws and court cases that have sought to

23. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
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return to the states the ability to enact and enforce consumer-financialprotection laws.
A. National Banks as National Favorites
Until the 1860s, the banking system in the United States was
decentralized.24 Recognizing the shortcomings of a fragmented
system—namely the inability to fund its operations—Congress set out
to establish a well-functioning national banking system with a series of
enactments in the mid-1860s collectively referred to as the National
Bank Act (NBA).25 In addition to the creation of a national currency,
one of the chief goals of the NBA was to force the conversion of statechartered banks into national charters;26 in this aim, the NBA imposed
an onerous 10 percent tax on all bank notes issued by state-chartered
banks.27
Noting the clarity of purpose underlying the legislation, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted ambiguities in the NBA by
opting for readings that are consistent with a national vision of
banking.28 And, especially when confronted with state legislation that
tended to inhibit the growth of a vibrant national banking system, the
Court has ruled in ways that ensured competitive equality between
state and national banks or even conferred a competitive advantage on
national banks.29 For example, in Tiffany v. National Bank of
24. See MICHAEL S. BARR, HOWELL E. JACKSON & MARGARET E. TAHYAR, FINANCIAL
REGULATION: LAW & POLICY 35–37 (2016) (detailing earlier, short-lived attempts to create a
national banking system, followed by an era of decentralized “free banking”).
25. See An Act to Provide a National Currency, Secured by a Pledge of United States Stocks,
and to Provide for the Circulation and Redemption Thereof, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (1863), repealed
and reenacted with amendments by An Act to Provide a National Currency, Secured by a Pledge
of United States Bonds, and to Provide for the Circulation and Redemption Thereof, ch. 106, 13
Stat. 99 (1864). See generally S. Res. 298, 66th Cong. (1920) (compiling the statutes which
constitute “The National Bank Act and Acts Amendatory Thereof and Supplementary
Thereto”).
26. BARR ET AL., supra note 24, at 38–39.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S.
299, 314–15 (1978) (“Close examination of the National Bank Act of 1864, its legislative history,
and its historical context makes clear that . . . Congress intended to facilitate . . . a ‘national
banking system.’”); Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220, 229 (1903) (explaining that by enacting the
NBA, Congress sought to create a banking “system extending throughout the country, and
independent, so far as powers conferred are concerned, of state legislation which, if permitted to
be applicable, might impose limitations and restrictions as various and as numerous as the
States”).
29. See, e.g., Farmers’ & Mechs.’ Nat’l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 34 (1875) (finding that a
state remedy for usury against national banks was preempted by the NBA, and explaining that
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Missouri,30 the Court was confronted with a Missouri statute that was
intended to make banking unprofitable in the state by restricting the
interest rates banks could charge while permitting all other lenders to
collect interest at a higher rate.31 The Court identified congressional
intent in the NBA to conclude that “National banks have been
National favorites” in the eyes of the federal government,32 and as such
should be permitted to charge the highest rate of interest enjoyed by
any lender under state law.33 Tiffany would serve as the foundation for
a hundred years of Supreme Court jurisprudence, known as the “[m]ost
[f]avored [l]ender [d]octrine,” in which the Court sought to implement
the NBA’s aim of a strong national banking system by overriding state
laws that impeded this goal.34
In a continuation of this trend, the Supreme Court in Marquette
National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha35 held that the NBA
provision codified at 12 U.S.C. § 85, which permits national banks to
charge “interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State . . . where

“the States can exercise no control over [national banks], nor in any wise affect their operation,
except in so far as Congress may see proper to permit”).
30. Tiffany v. Nat’l Bank of Mo., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409 (1873).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 413.
33. Id. at 412–13. The Court has regularly noted that the establishment of a national banking
system is premised on the perceived utility of such a system to the federal government. See Easton,
188 U.S. at 230 (tracing the origins of this relationship by pointing out that “[t]he whole opinion
of the court, in McCulloch v. Maryland, is founded on, and sustained by, the idea that the bank is
an instrument which is ‘necessary and proper for carrying into effect the powers vested in the
government of the United States.’”); Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 283 (1896)
(“National banks are instrumentalities of the Federal government . . . .”); Farmers’ & Mechs.’
Nat’l Bank, 91 U.S. at 33 (“The national banks organized under the act are instruments designed
to be used to aid the government in the administration of an important branch of the public
service.”). Historically, as exemplified by the temporal relationship between the Civil War and
the NBA, the importance of banks to the federal government related to the use of banks to raise
funds for war. See BARR ET AL., supra note 24, at 32, 34, 37 (noting that each major foray into the
creation of a national banking system was related to the necessity of funding wars). In modernity,
in addition to raising funds for the federal government, banks assist in the implementation of
federal monetary policy. See Monetary Policy Basics, FED. RES. EDUC.,
https://www.federalreserveeducation.org/about-the-fed/structure-and-functions/monetary-policy
[https://perma.cc/GJ4D-YGSL] (“The term ‘monetary policy’ refers to what the Federal Reserve,
the nation’s central bank, does to influence the amount of money and credit in the U.S. economy.
What happens to money and credit affects interest rates . . . and the performance of the U.S.
economy.”).
34. See Schiltz, supra note 4, at 545 (“[Section] 85 consistently has been interpreted to permit
national banks to make loans at the highest rates permitted any type of lender under the laws of
the state in which the bank is located.”).
35. Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
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the bank is located,”36 allowed national banks to charge the interest
rates permissible in the state in which they are located37 to customers
in any other state in the country.38 The Court examined the legislative
history of the NBA and the Court’s own interpretations to conclude
that the purpose of § 85 was to facilitate a national banking system,39
and thus, any concerns about competitive equality between state and
national banks40 or about the ability of states to enact usury laws were
immaterial.41 With the Marquette decision, the Court created a
regime—one that would come to be known as the exportation
doctrine—in which a bank could be formally “located” in one
jurisdiction solely for purposes of interest-rate exportation.42
B. Extension to State-Chartered Banks and the Enlarged Meaning of
“Interest”
In the wake of Marquette, several states commenced a race to the
bottom, either reducing or removing altogether interest-rate ceilings
on consumer loans in an attempt to lure national banks.43 Faced with
what turned out to be an incredible competitive disadvantage, state
banks lobbied Congress to level the playing field.44 Congress
responded with the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA),45 which borrowed statutory
language from § 85 to extend the privilege of interest-rate exportation

36. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2018).
37. At the time of Marquette, interstate branching was prohibited, so banks were “located”
in only one jurisdiction. See Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis, 439 U.S. at 309. Accordingly,
the determination of the location of a bank for purposes of interest-rate exportation was simple.
The national bank in Marquette was lending via mail across state lines. Id. at 310.
38. Id. at 313.
39. Id. at 314–15.
40. Id. at 314 (“Whatever policy of ‘competitive equality’ has been discerned in other
sections of the National Bank Act, . . . [§ 85 and its predecessors] have been interpreted for over
a century to give ‘advantages to National banks over their State competitors.’” (quoting Tiffany
v. Nat’l Bank of Mo., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409, 413 (1873))).
41. Id. at 318 (rejecting the importance of the argument “that the ‘exportation’ of interest
rates . . . will significantly impair the ability of States to enact effective usury laws” because such
a limitation “has always been implicit in the structure of the National Bank Act”).
42. See Schiltz, supra note 4, at 543 (“Under the Exportation Doctrine . . . depository
institutions are given the power to select one particular state’s consumer credit regulation and
give it preemptive effect over all other state consumer credit laws.”).
43. BARR ET AL., supra note 24, at 126–27.
44. Id. at 127.
45. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96–221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.).
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to state banks.46 In Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts,47 the First
Circuit confirmed that this state-chartered bank analogue of the NBA
permits state banks to export interest rates in the same manner as
national banks post-Marquette.48 The DIDMCA and the cases
interpreting it represent the first of several transgressions of the
ideological underpinnings of the exportation doctrine. That is,
extending the ability to export interest rates to state-chartered banks is
difficult to square with the NBA’s original goal of preventing bias
against nationally chartered banks in order to facilitate a vibrant
national banking system.49
Over the next fifteen years, the OCC effected another
enlargement of the exportation doctrine by expanding the meaning of
“interest” as used in § 85. Courts largely accepted the OCC’s expansive
interpretations of “interest” to encompass late fees50 and credit card
overlimit fees.51 And in 1997, the OCC issued an interpretive letter
setting forth a liberal test for determining what constitutes interest for
purposes of the exportation doctrine,52 as well as providing an
illustrative list.53
Finally, in the most severe violation of the underpinnings of the
exportation doctrine, an array of nonbank lenders have acquired the
ability to preempt state consumer-protection laws by entering into

46. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (2018) (permitting interest to be charged by “[s]tate-chartered
insured depository institutions . . . at the rate allowed by the laws of the State . . . where the bank
is located”).
47. Greenwood Tr. Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1992).
48. See id. at 827 (“[W]e believe that several principles inherent in section 85 were transfused
into section 521, the critical item for present purposes [being] the principle of exportation.”).
49. See Schiltz, supra note 4, at 545 (explaining how § 85, “a statutory provision aimed at
preventing states from destroying the national banking system in its infancy, came to justify a
legal doctrine preempting virtually all significant state consumer credit laws”).
50. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740 (1996); Greenwood Tr. Co., 971 F.2d
at 819.
51. Watson v. First Union Nat’l Bank of S.C., 837 F. Supp. 146, 150 (D.S.C. 1993); Tikkanen
v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 801 F. Supp. 270, 278 (D. Minn. 1992).
52. See OCC, Interpretive Letter No. 803, at 2 (Oct. 7, 1997) (“The term ‘interest’ as used
in 12 U.S.C. § 85 includes any payment compensating a creditor or prospective creditor for an
extension of, credit, making available of a line of credit, or any default or breach by a borrower
of a condition upon which credit was extended . . . .” (emphasis added) (quoting 12 C.F.R.
§ 74001(a) (1997))).
53. See id. (“[Interest] includes, among other things, the following fees connected with credit
extension or availability: numerical periodic rates, late fees, not sufficient funds (NSF) fees,
overlimit fees, annual fees, cash advance fees, and membership fees.”).
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rent-a-charter arrangements with state and national banks,54 in which
a bank formally originates loans in accordance with a nonbank lender’s
credit decisions and then immediately sells the loans to the nonbank
lender.55 While the previous enlargements of the exportation doctrine
constituted expansions of what chartered banks could themselves do,
the exploitation of the doctrine by rent-a-charter arrangements permits
wholly undeserving entities to evade state usury limits without
incurring any commensurate obligations and without serving any of the
beneficial functions of traditional banks.56
C. Expansive Preemption Determinations by the OCC and Reviewing
Courts
As illustrated by its liberal interpretations of the definition of
“interest” for purposes of the exportation doctrine, the OCC has often
enunciated expansive and favorable statutory interpretations for
national banks.57 Moreover, when prompted to make determinations
regarding the preemption of state banking and consumer-protection
regulation, the OCC has invariably found that the state laws were
preempted. For example, in 2004 the OCC promulgated regulations
that declared that “state laws that obstruct, impair, or condition a
national bank’s ability to fully exercise its Federally authorized real
estate lending powers” were preempted.58 This expansive blanket
preemption provided that “a national bank may make real estate loans
. . . without regard to state law limitations concerning” mortgage
disclosures, interest rates, origination and servicing, and loan terms.59
And when OCC action was challenged in court, judicial deference to

54. The OCC maintains that, after several enforcement actions and associated guidance in
the early 2000s, it has completely eliminated rent-a-charter arrangements between payday lenders
and national banks. See Payday Lending, OCC, https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/consumerprotection/payday-lending/index-payday-lending.html [https://perma.cc/4T7F-527K] (listing the
enforcement actions “that eliminated these relationships from the national banking system”).
55. See, e.g., BARR ET AL., supra note 24, at 622 (summarizing the proliferation of payday
lenders entering into rent-a-charter arrangements).
56. See Schiltz, supra note 4, at 540–41 (explaining that privileges accorded chartered banks
are tied to the important role they play as financial intermediaries, and that these privileges
additionally come at the cost of “extensive regulation of almost every facet of [banks’] day-to-day
operations”).
57. See generally id. (detailing the various interpretations advanced by the OCC that
expanded the range of state laws preempted by § 85).
58. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904,
1911 (Jan. 13, 2004).
59. Id. at 1917.
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the OCC’s interpretations under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resource Defense Council, Inc.60 was often dispositive.61
D. Dodd-Frank’s Spirit of Stronger State Regulatory Mechanisms
The authors of Dodd-Frank concluded that the OCC’s
preemption determinations and the judicial affirmations thereof
prevented the operation of strong state consumer-protection laws and
enforcement in the years leading up the financial crisis.62 Dodd-Frank’s
drafters further concluded that this phenomenon contributed
significantly to the subprime mortgage crisis.63 In response, DoddFrank seeks to return to the states the ability to effectively monitor and
regulate financial institutions.64
In furtherance of this goal, Dodd-Frank prescribes the preemption
standard that the OCC must use in deciding which state consumerfinancial laws are preempted.65 Whereas the OCC had previously
found state laws preempted if applying the laws would merely
“obstruct, impair, or condition” the operation of a national bank,
Dodd-Frank requires a higher preemption standard. Dodd-Frank
incorporates the preemption standards of a Supreme Court case,
Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson,66 which preempts state
laws that “prevent[] or significantly interfere[] with the exercise by the
national bank of its powers.”67 Dodd-Frank also requires the OCC to

60. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
61. See, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 739 (1996) (applying Chevron
deference to the OCC’s interpretation of “interest” as encompassing late fees); Wachovia Bank,
N.A. v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556, 560 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming the district court’s Chevron analysis
that concluded that the OCC’s finding of preemption of a state registration and consumerprotection-investigation law was reasonable), aff’d, 550 U.S. 1 (2007); see also Schiltz, supra note
4, at 620 (“A close analysis of expansion of the substantive scope of the Exportation Doctrine
illustrates the vigor of judicial deference to federal agency interpretations in the area of consumer
credit regulation.”).
62. See S. REP. No. 111-176, at 17 (2010) (concluding that the OCC’s preemption decisions
had “actively created an environment where abusive mortgage lending could flourish without
State controls”).
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 25b (2018) (imposing a host of requirements on the analysis of
preemption of state consumer-financial laws). See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The DoddFrank Act’s Expansion of State Authority To Protect Consumers of Financial Services, 36 J. CORP.
L. 893 (2011) (examining provisions in Dodd-Frank that empower states to enact and enforce
consumer-financial-protection laws).
65. See Wilmarth, supra note 64, at 927–30.
66. Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996).
67. 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
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make such preemption determinations on a case-by-case basis,68 a clear
rejection of the OCC’s blanket preemption of state mortgage-lending
regulation in 2004.69 Additionally, in an apparent assignment of blame
to the OCC for its expansive interpretations about which state
consumer-financial laws were preempted for national banks before the
financial crisis, Dodd-Frank expressly prescribes a more searching
standard of review for courts reviewing such OCC determinations.70
Post–financial crisis, the Supreme Court has also enunciated a
more restrictive view of financial regulation preemption. The
paradigmatic example is the Court’s rejection of preemption of state
regulation in Cuomo v. Clearing House Association,71 in which the
Court’s review of an OCC regulation concerning preemption seemed
rather different than its approach to a similar regulation two years prior
in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.72 In Watters—decided in 2007,
before the financial crisis—the Court upheld an OCC regulation that
permitted a mortgage-lending subsidiary of a national bank to enjoy
the same preemption of state consumer-financial-protection laws as its
68. Id. The provision additionally requires that, in making preemption determinations on a
case-by-case basis, the OCC “shall first consult with the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection
and shall take the views of the Bureau into account when making the determination.” Id.
§ 25b(b)(3)(B).
69. See Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg.
1904 (Jan. 13, 2004) (promulgating rule preempting all state mortgage laws “that obstruct, impair,
or condition a national bank’s ability to fully exercise its Federally authorized real estate lending
powers”). In 2011, as required by § 25b, the OCC implemented a final rule removing the
“obstruct, impair, or condition” language from the regulation, and inserting the above-mentioned
statutorily prescribed changes into its regulations. Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; DoddFrank Act Implementation, 76 Fed. Reg. 43549, 43551–52, 43556 (July 21, 2011) (current version
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 (2018)).
70. Congress expressly revoked from the OCC the very deferential standard of review for
courts reviewing agency determinations announced in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984). See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A) (directing courts
reviewing the OCC’s preemption determinations for state consumer-financial laws to apply a
more stringent standard of review, involving an assessment of “the validity of such
determinations, depending upon the thoroughness evident in the consideration of the agency, the
validity of the reasoning of the agency, the consistency with other valid determinations made by
the agency, and other factors which the court finds persuasive and relevant”).
71. Cuomo v. Clearing House Assoc., 557 U.S. 519, 536 (2009).
72. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 20–22 (2007); see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.,
Cuomo v. Clearing House: The Supreme Court Responds to the Subprime Financial Crisis and
Delivers a Major Victory for the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection 14 (GWU Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 479, 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=1499216 [https://perma.cc/3JG9-V33G] (noting the opposite rulings on highly similar facts, and
reviewing the Cuomo decision to illustrate the difference between the Court’s pre–financial crisis
decisions affirming OCC preemption determinations and its post–financial crisis decisions
restricting the OCC’s preemption determinations).
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parent bank.73 But in Cuomo—decided in 2009, as the damage caused
by the subprime mortgage crisis was on full display—the Court rejected
an OCC regulation which forbid state attorneys general from bringing
actions to enforce state law against national banks.74 Although the four
dissenting justices in Cuomo maintained that the Court’s opinion in
Watters should lead the Court to sustain the regulation on the same
grounds,75 the majority opinion attempted to narrow the precedential
scope of Watters.76
II. THE MADDEN DECISION, ITS RAMIFICATIONS, AND THE
MOTIVES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
The Second Circuit’s opinion in Madden, which held that a
nonbank third-party debt collector was not entitled to receive the
protection of the exportation doctrine,77 has caused uncertainty in a
variety of financial-services contexts. In withholding the doctrine from
the debt collector, the court—seemingly motivated by a number of
sensible concerns—effectively limited the type of actors that are
entitled to the doctrine’s privileges. The information costs generated
by the decision, however, have proved too great to accept in exchange
for any success in halting the trend of expansive financial regulation
preemption.
The plaintiff in Madden brought suit—as the representative of a
putative class—against a debt collector, Midland Funding, LLC, who
had purchased her charged-off credit card debt from Bank of
America.78 Bank of America, who, as a nationally chartered bank, is
uncontrovertibly entitled to the exportation doctrine, had originated
and serviced the debt at issue until it became nonperforming, at which
point the bank sold the debt to Midland Funding.79 The suit alleged,

73. Watters, 550 U.S. at 20–22; see Wilmarth, supra note 72, at 2 (“Watters took a broad view
of the preemptive reach of the NBA . . . .”).
74. Cuomo, 550 U.S. at 529–33.
75. See id. at 552 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Finally, this Court’s decision in Watters . . .
supports OCC’s construction of the statute.”).
76. See Wilmarth, supra note 72, at 12 (examining each opinion to conclude that “[t]he
majority opinion in Cuomo sharply limited the scope and precedential effect of the Court’s
previous opinion in Watters”).
77. Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 247 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.
Ct. 2505 (2016) (mem.).
78. Id. at 247–48. Midland actually acquired the debt from Bank of America subsidiary bank
FIA Card Services, N.A., which is also nationally chartered. Id.
79. Id. at 248.
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inter alia, that Midland’s assessment of 27 percent interest on the debt
was usurious under New York law.80 The district court entered
judgment for Midland, finding that the debt collector was entitled to
the same protection from state usury law claims as the originating
bank.81 On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed after finding, in
accordance with the preemption analysis announced by the Supreme
Court in Barnett,82 that applying state usury laws against Midland (that
is, declining to apply the exportation doctrine) would not “significantly
interfere with [the national bank’s] ability to exercise its powers under
the [NBA].”83 The court conceded that the ruling might depress the
price at which a national bank could sell its nonperforming debt to
third parties, but indicated that such an effect did not rise to the level
of “significant interference.”84
What the Second Circuit either failed to consider or believed
unlikely to materialize was the impact of its analysis beyond the context
of third-party debt collectors. Specifically, the court may not have
anticipated the extension of its ruling to an enormous85 secondary loan
market that benefits a variety of actors.86
The Madden ruling injected an unprecedented element of
uncertainty into a market that had long relied on the fixed quality of
debt obligations underlying securities.87 Though ruling on the

80. Id.; see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.40 (McKinney 2010) (capping permissible interest rates
at 25 percent).
81. Madden, 786 F.3d at 248.
82. Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996). For a discussion of
Congress’s codification of the Barnett standard as part of a trend toward returning the ability to
regulate financial institutions to the states, see supra Part I.
83. Madden, 786 F.3d at 251.
84. Id. The Second Circuit remanded the case for the district court to make a further
determination on the effect of a choice-of-law provision in the loan agreements. Id. at 249. On
remand, the district court found that to give effect to the choice-of-law provision and apply
Delaware’s more permissive interest rate limitations would violate a fundamental public policy
of New York state. See Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 237 F. Supp. 3d 130, 151 (S.D.N.Y.
2017) (“I will thus apply New York law to Plaintiff’s claims.”).
85. See generally Brief of the Structured Fin. Indus. Grp., Inc., & the Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts.
Ass’n as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 16 (describing the size of the
secondary market).
86. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON
RISK
RETENTION
8–9
(2010),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/
securitization/riskretention.pdf [https://perma.cc/GG2N-MNYK] (reviewing the economic
benefits to market participants flowing from securitization and speculating that these benefits
“may lower the cost of credit to households and businesses”).
87. See Bryan Chegwidden, Second Circuit Decision Could Disrupt Secondary Market for
Bank-Originated Loans, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (2015),
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preemptive scope of national bank lending, commentators have noted
that the same limitation might be applied by future courts to the
identical provision for state-chartered banks, increasing the
uncertainty faced by assignees of bank-originated loans.88
Facially, in light of the sheer size of securitization in the American
economy,89 a rule that ties the legality of a loan’s terms to the entity
that holds it seems likely to seriously impede both the efficiency and
the liquidity of the system, reducing or eliminating the benefits
securitization confers.90 One of the principal benefits of securitization

https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/07/08/second-circuit-decision-could-disrupt-secondarymarket-for-bank-originated-loans [https://perma.cc/CJP2-VKWX] (“Consequently, unless
reversed, Madden could significantly disrupt the secondary market for bank loans originated by
national banks, as well as affect the valuation of such loans already held by non-bank investors.”).
Congress has recently introduced “Madden fix” bills in both chambers that would, in essence,
codify the contractual principle of “valid-when-made.” E.g., Protecting Consumers’ Access to
Credit Act of 2017, S. 1642, 115th Cong. (referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs on July 27, 2017). For instance, the Protecting Consumers’ Access to Credit Card
Act of 2017 would insert the following language into both § 85 of the NBA and its analogue at
§ 1831d:
A loan that is valid when made as to its maximum rate of interest in accordance with
this subsection shall remain valid with respect to such rate regardless of whether the
loan is subsequently sold, assigned, or otherwise transferred to a third party, and may
be enforced by such third party notwithstanding any State law to the contrary.
Id. Professor Adam Levitin has persuasively detailed his concerns that the bill might pave the way
for increased predatory lending. Adam J. Levitin, ‘Madden Fix’ Bills are a Recipe for Predatory
Lending, AM. BANKER (Aug. 28, 2017, 10:24 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/
madden-fix-bills-are-a-recipe-for-predatory-lending [https://perma.cc/4H8R-YAHQ]. Levitin
fears that the bills’ failure to distinguish between “relatively benign transactions, like credit card
securitization or even facilitating a secondary market in defaulted loans” from “schemes that have
no purpose other than the evasion of state usury laws and other consumer protections” will serve
to congressionally authorize these latter transactions. Id. However, as explained infra at Part
III.B, even if a Madden fix law is enacted, a robust application of the true lender doctrine should—
at least with respect to rent-a-charter lenders—operate to prevent this outcome, as the test does
not ever arrive at a conclusion that a loan has become usurious upon sale or assignment, but rather
that it was invalid even at the point of origination because it was not genuinely “made” by a lender
entitled to charge such interest rates. Stated another way, the true lender doctrine seeks to
identify whether loans truly were valid-when-made, and only an affirmative answer will even
trigger application of the Madden fix law.
88. See Marc P. Franson, Michael S. Himmel, Peter C. Manbeck & Kenneth P. Marin,
Federal Court Decision Creates Uncertainty for Non-Bank Loan Assignees Regarding the Scope
of Federal Preemption of State Usury Laws, 132 BANKING L.J. 413, 415–16 (2015) (explaining that
the decision’s impact may ultimately be applied to state-chartered banks).
89. See Brief of the Structured Fin. Indus. Grp., Inc. & the Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 16, at 10 (finding nine trillion dollars in loans
securitized in 2014).
90. See BARR ET AL., supra note 24, at 1140–42 (reviewing the benefits and logic of
securitization).
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is the increased lending it facilitates.91 Indeed, the ability of banks to
offer a variety of lending options to consumers and businesses is
inextricably tied to a well-functioning secondary market.92 A skittish
secondary market invariably dampens banks’ willingness to extend
credit. Unsure whether there will be a market for pools of loans that
will otherwise remain on their balance sheets, banks lend more
sparingly.
Empirically, the Madden ruling has reduced the value in the
secondary market of potentially usurious loans.93 Moreover, even if the
loans and parties in a transaction on the secondary loan market are
unaffected by Madden—by virtue of having no nexus with Second
Circuit states—the decision has nevertheless imposed on them
additional information costs by forcing them to ascertain whether the
loans they are buying are subject to the Second Circuit’s new rule.94
Several facets of the Madden opinion suggest that the court was
motivated, at least in part, by a desire to withhold the benefits of the
exportation doctrine from nonbank entities. While the effect of the
ruling has emanated—perhaps unintentionally—beyond the market
segments represented by the parties to the case, the court’s analysis was
far from unsophisticated. Indeed, the opinion evidences an awareness
of the troublingly expansive scope of the exportation doctrine, as well
as an understanding of several broad trends in financial regulation that
are designed to remedy some of the problems thought to have led to
the financial crisis.
For example, the court indicated its discomfort with the breadth
of the exportation doctrine, expressing its unease about “an overly
broad application” of the doctrine.95 It further characterized the effect

91. See generally Lowell L. Bryan, Structured Securitized Credit: A Superior Technology for
Lending, 1 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 6 (1988) (delineating the benefits of securitizations to banks,
investors, and borrowers via increased availability of credit).
92. See Brief of the Structured Fin. Indus. Grp., Inc. & the Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 16, at 6 (“The ability to securitize bank loans
is fundamentally important to banks, borrowers, and the economy.”).
93. Colleen Honigsberg, Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Richard Squire, How Does Legal
Enforceability Affect Consumer Lending? Evidence from a Natural Experiment, J.L. & ECONS.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 4), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2780215&download=yes [https://perma.cc/5LRQ-F5X2].
94. See Marvin, supra note 12, at 1837 & n.185 (collecting sources that illustrate the costs
imposed on the secondary market by the imposition of new requirements of due diligence postMadden).
95. Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.
Ct. 2505 (2016).
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of preempting state usury laws for debt collectors as tantamount to
creating “an end-run around usury laws for non-national bank entities
that are not acting on behalf of a national bank.”96
Additionally, the Second Circuit’s principal reliance on Barnett’s
“prevents or significantly interferes” standard of preemption is a goodfaith application of Dodd-Frank’s more stringent standard for finding
preemption of state consumer-protection laws. As discussed in Part I,
Congress codified the more restrictive standard from Barnett in DoddFrank with a clear intent to repudiate both the OCC’s expansive
preemption interpretations and similarly permissive judicial decisions
leading up to the financial crisis.97 The Barnett standard thus
intentionally imposed a variety of restraints on the OCC and reviewing
courts in making preemption determinations moving forward.98
Madden’s analysis of relevant case law similarly evidences a
circumscribed view of the exportation doctrine, one that is consistent
with an increased regulatory focus on risk retention by originating
entities.99 The court’s discussion of on-point cases reveals a conception
of the exportation doctrine in which the doctrine is only properly
extended when the loan remains relatively close to the originating
bank. Specifically, presented with sister circuit precedent that
appeared to weigh in favor of the opposite ruling, the court
distinguished each case by reference to the role the banks continued to
play in those cases, whether they retained some portion of ownership
of the debt or continued to collect its interest.100 The court concluded
that because Midland and the originating banks were entirely separate
entities and because the originating bank had no ongoing interest in
the loan, Midland was not entitled to the exportation doctrine.101
Moreover, the Second Circuit in Madden focused on the proper
limits of preemption of state usury law claims to the exclusion of the
contract principle known as “valid-when-made,” which dictates that a

96. Id. at 251–52.
97. Madden, 786 F.3d at 251–52.
98. Id.
99. For a discussion of risk retention as a regulatory approach to realign incentives in the
origination and securitization processes, see infra Part III.C.
100. See Madden, 786 F.3d at 252 (distinguishing Krispin v. May Dept. Stores Co., 218 F.3d
919 (8th Cir. 2000), on grounds that in that case “the national bank retained ownership of the
accounts”); id. at 253 (distinguishing Phipps v. FDIC, 417 F.3d 1006 (8th Cir. 2005), on grounds
that in that case “the national bank was the entity that charged the interest to which the plaintiffs
objected”).
101. Id. at 252–53.
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loan that is not usurious when it is made cannot become usurious upon
assignment.102 The Restatement of Contracts, the Uniform
Commercial Code, and centuries of case law support the principle of
valid-when-made, reinforcing the intuitive notion that loan obligations
are, in essence, currency whose validity cannot be disrupted by the
mere substitution of obligees.103 The court’s seemingly deliberate
decision to focus on preemption to the exclusion of the contract
analysis further strengthens the inference that its principal motivation
was the imposition of a constraint on the exportation doctrine.
Finally, the Madden court’s adoption of key arguments from the
plaintiff-appellant’s brief hints at the court’s motivation to shrink the
exportation doctrine.104 That brief advocated for a limited conception
of federal preemption on several grounds, citing the various
requirements that Dodd-Frank placed on preempting state consumerprotection laws and pointing to administrative trends toward
narrowing the scope of preemption.105 In addition to setting forth the
roadmap that the court would eventually use to distinguish precedent
from other circuits,106 the plaintiff-appellant’s brief explicated how the
Second Circuit should—and in fact, exactly how it did—apply the
current, more stringent standard from Dodd-Frank to find that the
state usury laws were not preempted.107 That the court’s opinion closely
tracked a brief dedicated primarily to contracting the scope of state
consumer-protection-law preemption seems to suggest that the
decision was motivated by a similar purpose.

102. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 15, at 8 (“Under the longestablished ‘valid-when-made’ rule, if the interest-rate term in a bank’s original loan agreement
was nonusurious, the loan does not become usurious upon assignment, and so the assignee may
lawfully charge interest at the original rate.”).
103. See Nichols v. Fearson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 103, 109 (1833) (delineating the “cardinal rule[]
in the doctrine of usury” that “a contract, which, in its inception, is unaffected by usury, can never
be invalidated by any subsequent usurious transaction”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 336(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“The right of an assignee is subject to any defense
or claim of the obligor which accrues before the obligor receives notification of the assignment,
but not to defenses or claims which accrue thereafter . . . .”); U.C.C. § 2-210(2) (AM. LAW INST.
& UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (“Unless otherwise agreed all rights of either seller or buyer can be
assigned . . . .”).
104. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 12, 14–15, 21–25, 33, 39, Madden, 786 F.3d 246 (No.
14–2131–cv) (setting forth each of the arguments the Second Circuit would ultimately adopt in its
opinion).
105. Id. at 39–42.
106. Id. at 25. For a discussion of the court’s distinguishing precedent, see supra note 100 and
accompanying text.
107. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 104, at 39.
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III. THE “TRUE LENDER” DOCTRINE
A recent string of cases, seemingly motivated in part by the same
concerns as the Madden court—nondeserving institutions exploiting
the exportation doctrine—have developed and implemented a regime
that effectively excises those nondeserving lenders from the scope of
the exportation doctrine while avoiding the overly broad effects of
Madden. Instead of the imposition of a bright-line rule like that in
Madden, where the loan holder’s status as a nonbank at the time of
adjudication was dispositive, the true lender doctrine eschews form in
favor of substance, examining the economic realities of lending
arrangements to determine whether the real originator of the loan is
entitled to the broad protection of the exportation doctrine.
A. History of the True Lender Doctrine
The true lender doctrine traces its origins to an effort by Georgia’s
legislature to eliminate in-state payday lenders that were
circumventing the state’s usury laws by entering into rent-a-charter
arrangements with out-of-state banks.108 The Georgia law codified a
totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine when a “purported
agent shall be considered a de facto lender” for purposes of applying
state usury laws.109 The touchstone of the statute’s test is that an agent
will be considered the de facto lender when “the entire circumstances
of the transaction show that the purported agent holds, acquires, or
maintains a predominant economic interest in the revenues generated
by the loan.”110
Seemingly influenced, at least in part, by the Georgia statute, the
first judicial deployment of the test to reach resolution on the merits111

108. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-17-2(b)(4) (2011). See generally John D. Skees, Note, The
Resurrection of Historic Usury Principles for Consumption Loans in a Federal Banking System,
55 CATH. U. L. REV. 1131 (2006) (discussing the Georgia statute and its subsequent legal
challenges, and advocating for the enactment of similar laws in other states).
109. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-17-2(b)(4).
110. Id.
111. An incipient version of the doctrine was applied in a series of payday-lending cases in
the early 2000s. While these cases appear to have partially inspired the recent true lender cases,
the discussions in these early cases are confined to the propriety of removal to federal court of
state actions after preemption is asserted as a basis for subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Colorado ex rel. Salazar v. Ace Cash Express Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1285 (D. Colo. 2002)
(remanding to state court because the NBA cannot form the basis of “federal question removal
jurisdiction in actions against entities which are not banks”). Accordingly, these courts never
ruled on whether state usury claims are preempted in the face of a true lender theory. See

HANNON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

THE TRUE LENDER DOCTRINE

3/1/2018 12:16 AM

1281

appears to have been in People ex rel. Spitzer v. County Bank of
Rehoboth Beach.112 In Rehoboth Beach, New York’s attorney general
brought an action against two nonbank payday lenders and their
Delaware-chartered bank partner, alleging that all three were part of
“a scheme to permit [the payday lenders] to circumvent New York’s
usury laws.”113 The defendants urged the New York appeals court to
adopt a test to find that the chartered bank, not the nonbank entities,
was the lender for purposes of determining choice of usury law.114 This
test was developed by the OCC to help national banks determine where
a loan is made for purposes of deciding which state’s interest rate limits
are to be exported.115 The exceedingly formalistic test provides that a
loan is made where each of three primary lending functions occur—
“the decision to extend credit, the extension of credit itself, and the
disbursal of the proceeds of a loan.”116 The adoption of this test would
have conclusively identified the chartered bank as the lender. The
court, however, rejected this test, explaining:
It strikes us that we must look to the reality of the arrangement and
not the written characterization that the parties seek to give it, much
like Frank Lloyd Wright’s aphorism that “form follows function.”
Thus, an examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding
this type of business association must be used to determine who is the
“true lender,” with the key factor being “who had the predominant
economic interest” in the transactions.117

Several years later, the West Virginia Supreme Court, citing
Rehoboth Beach, embraced the true lender test.118 The West Virginia
CashCall, Inc. v. Morrisey, No. 12-1274, 2014 WL 2404300, at *14 (W. Va. May 30, 2014)
(explaining that the removal cases “were not adjudicated on the merits”).
112. People ex rel. Spitzer v. Cty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 846 N.Y.S.2d 436 (App. Div.
2007).
113. Id. at 438.
114. Id.
115. See OCC, Interpretive Letter No. 822, at 2–3 (Feb. 17, 1998) (elucidating the test for
where a bank is “located” for purposes of the exportation doctrine).
116. Id. at 8 (emphasis removed) (quoting 140 CONG. REC. S12,789 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1994)
(statement of Sen. Roth)).
117. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 846 N.Y.S.2d at 438–39. The court remanded the case to the
district court, id. at 439, after which the parties settled for $5.2 million. Press Release, N.Y. State
Office of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Cuomo Announces Distribution of $5.2 Million
Settlement
in
“Rent-a-Bank”
Payday
Lending
Scheme
(Nov.
17,
2009),
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/attorney-general-cuomo-announces-distribution-52-millionsettlement-rent-bank-payday [https://perma.cc/6AZE-E2XG].
118. See CashCall, Inc. v. Morrisey, No. 12-1274, 2014 WL 2404300, at *15 (W. Va. May 30,
2014).
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Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s application of the test to
conclude that the nonbank payday lender CashCall, not its statechartered bank partner that formally originated its loans, was the true
or de facto lender of the loans at issue.119 The nonbank defendants, like
the nonbanks in Rehoboth Beach, had urged the court to conclude that
the real lender should be determined by simple reference to which
entity both set the terms and conditions of the loan and extended the
credit.120 The court characterized this test as an examination of “only
the superficial appearance of CashCall’s business model.”121
Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion, sufficiently
supported by its “extraordinarily thorough” opinion,122 that the
arrangement between CashCall and its bank partner “placed the entire
monetary burden and risk of the loan program on CashCall, and not
on [the bank].”123
Because CashCall was not entitled to federal preemption of state
usury law claims, the West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court’s determination that the loans were usurious.124 The court further
affirmed a $10 million judgment—a figure arrived at by quadrupling
the amount of interest charged to CashCall’s 292 debtors in West
Virginia—as well as the trial court’s determination that all of
CashCall’s loans to West Virginians were void and “any debts still
owing . . . cancelled.”125

119. Id. at *14–15.
120. Id. at *14.
121. Id. at *15.
122. Id. at *24. The trial court found that:
CashCall had to procure the personal guarantee of its sole owner and stockholder . . .
to personally guarantee all of CashCall’s financial obligations to the [bank], including
the amounts of the loans prior to “purchase” by CashCall. Also, CashCall had to
indemnify [the bank] against all losses arising out of the Agreement, including claims
asserted by borrowers. CashCall was under a contractual obligation to purchase the
loans originated and funded by [the bank] only if CashCall’s underwriting guidelines
were followed when approving the loan.
Id. at *7.
123. Id. at *6.
124. Id. at *7.
125. Id. at *8. Jurisdictions are divided on whether a usurious loan should be judicially
reformed, making only the impermissible interest uncollectable, or whether a finding of usury
renders the entire loan void. Compare id., with McCormick v. Indep. Life & Annuity Co., 794
F.3d 817, 818 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Cancellation of the principal balance as a remedy for excessive
interest is legally impossible in Wisconsin . . . .”).
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Apparently buoyed by the success against CashCall in West
Virginia and another case in Maryland,126 the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) successfully persuaded a federal district
court in California to apply the true lender test to CashCall’s
partnership with a tribal financial institution on the Cheyenne
reservation in CFPB v. CashCall, Inc.127 In this partnership, as
described by the court:
CashCall, and not [the originating bank], placed its money at risk. It
is undisputed that CashCall deposited enough money into a reserve
account to fund two days of loans . . . and that [the originating bank]
used this money to fund consumer loans. It is also undisputed [that]
CashCall purchased all of [the originating bank’s] loans, and in fact
paid [the bank] more for each loan than the amount actually financed
. . . . Although CashCall waited a minimum of three days after the
funding of each loan before purchasing it, it is undisputed that
CashCall purchased each and every loan before any payments on the
loan had been made. CashCall assumed all economic risks and
benefits of the loans immediately upon assignment. CashCall bore the
risk of default as well as the regulatory risk. Indeed, CashCall agreed
to “fully indemnify [originating bank] for all costs arising or resulting
from any and all civil, criminal, or administrative claims or actions,
including but not limited to fines, costs, assessments and/or penalties
. . . [and] all reasonable attorneys fees and legal costs associated with
a defense of such claim or action.”128

The court marshalled each of the true lender authorities129 and
cogently applied a synthesized rule to the above arrangement before
concluding, “[b]ased on the totality of the circumstances,” that
CashCall “had the predominant economic interest in the loans and was
the ‘true lender’ and real party in interest.”130
The defendants in CashCall moved for, and the trial court granted,
an order certifying interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit for that

126. See CashCall, Inc. v. Md. Comm’r of Fin. Regulation, 139 A.3d 990, 1005 (Md. 2016)
(relying in part on determination that CashCall is the de facto lender in its lending arrangements
with banks to conclude that CashCall is not exempt from state regulation of “credit services
business[es]”).
127. CFPB v. CashCall, Inc., No. CV 15-7522-JFW (RAOx), 2016 WL 4820635, at *5–6 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 31, 2016), appeal denied, No. 17-80006 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2017).
128. Id. at *6 (final alteration in original).
129. See id. at *5–6 (citing the removal cases, the Georgia statute, Rehoboth Beach, and
Morrisey to outline the contours of the true lender doctrine).
130. Id. at *6.
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court to weigh in on the propriety of the true lender test.131 But the
Ninth Circuit, without elaboration, denied the interlocutory appeal.132
Accordingly, the true lender opinion stands, and the case has
progressed to the damages phase.133
B. Madden Under a True Lender Analysis
Reliance on the true lender doctrine to determine whether a third
party is entitled to preemption of state consumer-protection laws
would effectively avoid any of the market turbulence sown by Madden.
The true lender doctrine seeks, essentially, to expose sham transactions
in which a nonbank entity temporarily occupies the form of a bank to
evade state law. Any assignment of loans that does not give rise to
suspicions that this arrangement is at play will not implicate the true
lender doctrine at all.
In Madden, Bank of America had originated the loans at issue—
credit cards—with an uncontroverted desire to play the role of lender
in perpetuity and retain any and all risk relating to the loans, including
default. There was no agreement or scheme between Bank of America
and Midland Funding by which Bank of America would confer
preemptive force on the loans and subsequently sell them to Midland.
Bank of America, by any formulation of the true lender test, was
unequivocally the real party in interest. That certain accounts
defaulted, leading to a loss on Bank of America’s balance sheet and a
sale of the loan obligations to a third-party collector, cannot change the
fact that, at the point of origination, Bank of America was
functionally—not just formally—the true lender. Indeed, in this
context, the bank was forced to absorb the full impact of the economic
risk it assumed after the borrowers at issue defaulted on their
obligations.

131. Barbara S. Mishkin, Federal District Court Certifies Interlocutory Appeal in CFPB
Lawsuit Against CashCall, BALLARD SPAHR LLP (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.
consumerfinancemonitor.com/2017/01/19/federal-district-court-certifies-interlocutory-appeal-incfpb-lawsuit-against-cashcall [https://perma.cc/DNF3-JWFE].
132. See Order Denying Interlocutory Appeal, CFPB v. CashCall, Inc., No. 17-80006 (9th Cir.
Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2017/04/
order.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7HQ-XC8L].
133. See Order Denying Defendants’ Motion for a Stay of Proceedings at 2, CFPB v.
CashCall, Inc., No. CV 15-7522-JFW (RAOx) (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2017), ECF No. 253 (directing
the parties to file a joint report setting forth a trial schedule for the remaining issues in the case).
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Moreover, the true lender test does not at all affect the bedrock
contractual precept of valid-when-made.134 The cases identifying
nonbanks as the true lender do not hold, as the Second Circuit did in
Madden, that the loans at issue have become usurious upon assignment
to a nonbank entity. Rather, those cases found that the loans at issue
were not actually originated by the bank at all, and that the true
originator was in reality the nonbank entity. Accordingly, under the
true lender doctrine, the subsequent assignee of loans originated by a
bona fide lender—that is, a lender that is not originating loans on
behalf of a third party as part of a scheme to evade state consumer
laws—is equally entitled to those privileges in effect at the time of
origination.
C. Benefits of the True Lender Doctrine
As mentioned earlier, rent-a-charter participants are likely to
seize on factors identified by courts applying the true lender doctrine
and subsequently attempt to structure the form of their relationships
so as to avoid the appearance of sham transactions. Indeed, Chapman
& Cutler LLP generated client-facing content outlining the emergence
of the true lender doctrine and suggesting that in light of the doctrine’s
judicial success, rent-a-charter parties should consider implementing
structures in which “the bank has substantive duties and/or an
economic interest in the program or loans.”135
This suggestion, while sparse on details, illustrates that efforts to
structure lending partnerships to evade a finding that the nonbank
entity is the true lender will necessarily require the chartered bank to
play a greater role in the lending.136 More specifically, because courts
applying the true lender tests will disregard the names parties give to
their relationships and will instead seek to determine where the risks
genuinely lie, any successful strategy to evade an adverse true lender
finding must actually shift some of the lending risk and substantive
duties of the lending process to the bank. Accordingly, the virtue of the
true lender doctrine is that the more the parties try to avoid the
134. For the contracts law underpinnings of valid-when-made, see supra Part II.
135. Chapman Client Alert: New Federal Court Decision Applies the “True Lender” Doctrine
to Internet-Based Payday Lender, CHAPMAN & CUTLER LLP 2 (Feb. 1, 2016),
https://www.chapman.com/media/publication/601_Chapman_Federal_Court_Decision_Applies_
True_Lender_Doctrine_to_Internet-Based_Lenders_020116.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X5W-75ZX].
136. See id. (stating that the authors were “aware that some internet-based lending programs
are considering structural changes” to shift more substantive duties and economic interest to the
bank originator).
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appearance of sham transactions, the less the parties actually engage in
sham transactions. At some point on the continuum of possible
allocations of risk, both credit and legal, between bank and nonbank
entity, the bank that is entitled to the protection of the exportation
doctrine becomes the lender that enjoys it—perhaps jointly with the
nonbank entity.
This development may have two salutary effects, elaborated
below, on rent-a-charter activity. First, instead of serving as a mere
conduit, the bank, because its balance sheet is now actually exposed to
the nonbank’s credit decisions, must undertake affirmative efforts to
monitor the quality of loans it originates. Second, the more these loans
remain on the books of banks, the more they are subject to the bank’s
regulators,137 if only by proxy, and the more likely they are to be in
compliance with fundamental principles of bank risk management and
consumer protection.
1. Dodd-Frank’s Reliance on Risk Retention and How the True
Lender Doctrine Encourages the Same Realignment of Incentives.
Federal regulators, as mandated by Dodd-Frank,138 are increasingly
employing the concept of risk retention as a regulatory tool to remedy
misaligned incentives between originating entities and subsequent
owners of debt.139 In response to the perception that the absence of
credit risk exposure for originators140 caused pervasive deterioration of

137. Very generally, nationally-chartered banks have as their primary regulator the OCC, and
state-chartered banks are monitored at the federal level by either the Federal Reserve or the
FDIC (depending on whether the bank elects to join the Federal Reserve System), and are
additionally under the supervisory jurisdiction of relevant state banking authorities. For a more
complete description of which banks are monitored by which regulators, see MARK JICKLING &
EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., WHO REGULATES WHOM? AN OVERVIEW OF
U.S. FINANCIAL SUPERVISION (2010), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40249.pdf [https://perma.cc/
K8XJ-UTGP].
138. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(b)(1)–(2) (2018) (directing relevant federal banking regulators to
propose and promulgate rules that require bank sponsors of asset-backed securities to retain no
less than 5 percent of the credit risk of nonexempt securities).
139. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 86, at 14, 43
(summarizing the incentive alignment problems in securitization processes, and explaining that
retention of credit risk “gives securitizers or originators an explicit pecuniary stake in the
performance of their assets”).
140. See id. at 43–44 (detailing the incentive alignment problems revealed during the financial
crisis which were created, in part, because “[o]riginators typically did not retain any interest in
individual mortgages sold for securitization”).
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underwriting standards141 before the financial crisis, Congress sought
to require lenders to retain sufficient risk to prevent the unsound
extension of credit.142 The gist of these efforts is to incent banks to
originate only those loans they would feel comfortable retaining on
their balance sheet.
Here, the true lender doctrine accomplishes this same goal,
effectively transferring some proportion of risk to the originating bank
that, in most cases, would previously have been exposed to zero risk by
virtue of the terms of the rent-a-charter agreement.143
2. Regulation by Proxy.
The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) and the OCC are each tasked, inter alia, with
ensuring the safety and soundness144 of the banks they supervise as well
as promoting general tenets of fair dealing with customers.145
Accordingly, any threat posed to a bank’s prudential outlook by virtue
of the litigation, compliance, reputational, operational, and credit risks
attendant to third-party lending arrangements is squarely within their
supervisory purview. In this way, the ability of a bank’s primary
regulator to ensure both prudential and consumer-protection

141. Underwriting in the lending context refers to the process that banks undertake to
ascertain the relative risk of the extension of credit. Factors include individual creditworthiness,
loan-to-value ratio, and other indicia of default risk.
142. See generally BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 86 (outlining
congressional intent in mandating the production of a risk retention study and subsequent
rulemaking).
143. See, e.g., CashCall, Inc. v. Morrisey, No. 12-1274, 2014 WL 2404300, at *14 n.19 (W. Va.
May 30, 2014) (detailing the agreement between bank and nonbank lender which insulated the
bank from all credit and legal risk, and provided for considerable payments to continue
originating the nonbank’s loans).
144. “Safety and soundness” is bank-regulatory shorthand for a regulator’s mandate to
prevent the collapse of a bank and its collateral damage to depositors, the taxpayer, and the
greater economy. See Making Sense of the Federal Reserve: Safety and Soundness, FED. RES.
BANK OF SAINT LOUIS, https://www.stlouisfed.org/in-plain-english/safety-and-soundness
[https://perma.cc/2QFG-9MSB] (“The nation’s banking system is only as safe and sound as the
banks within the system. So the Federal Reserve examines banks regularly to identify and contain
bank risks.”).
145. See Mission, Vision, and Values, FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/
strategic/mission.html [https://perma.cc/7EKM-9EAU] (“The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) is an independent agency created by the Congress to maintain stability and
public confidence in the nation’s financial system by . . . examining and supervising financial
institutions for safety and soundness and consumer protection . . . .”); About the OCC, OCC,
https://www.occ.treas.gov/about/what-we-do/mission/index-about.html [https://perma.cc/BMP3TN7W] (“To ensure that national banks and federal savings associations operate in a safe and
sound manner, provide fair access to financial services, treat customers fairly, and comply with
applicable laws and regulations.”).
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compliance in its supervised banks, through formal and informal
enforcement mechanisms,146 is very likely to have a beneficial
moderating effect on third-party lending accomplished through rent-acharter arrangements structured to avoid a finding that the nonbank is
the true lender. Quite intuitively, the longer and more substantive the
role of the bank in the rent-a-charter arrangement, the more likely it is
that the bank’s regulators will effectively detect and deter abusive or
unsafe practices and encourage or mandate conformance with
fundamental principles of safety and soundness and consumer
protection.
The FDIC has long recognized the array of dangers that
accompany the intersection of nonbank lending and traditional
banking, and has periodically provided guidance to its member
institutions on properly managing these risks. At various points since
2005, the FDIC has updated its advice to meet new trends in paydaylending relationships with federally insured banks;147 in 2016, the FDIC
proposed guidance on how banks looking to partner with third-party
lenders might do so more responsibly, by mitigating credit, compliance,
and operational risk.148 The FDIC’s proposed guidance would require
that banks “engaging in significant third-party lending activities . . .
maintain capital149 well-above regulatory minimums,”150 and would
increase the frequency of such bank’s examinations.151
Although the OCC has consistently advocated for an expansive
conception of preemption of state consumer-protection laws for
national banks,152 it has also recognized the risks inherent in permitting
nonbanks to access the privileges accorded to traditional banks, and
has periodically issued guidance to nationally chartered banks that
146. See BARR ET AL., supra note 24, at 841–45 (summarizing the various formal and informal
enforcement mechanisms by which federal and state regulators seek to ensure the safety and
soundness of banks).
147. FDIC, FIL–14–2005, GUIDELINES FOR PAYDAY LENDING (2015), https://www.fdic.gov/
news/news/financial/2005/fil1405a.html [https://perma.cc/U34A-CVZU].
148. FDIC, FIL–50–2016, EXAMINATION GUIDANCE FOR THIRD-PARTY LENDING (2016),
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2016/fil16050a.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9AJ-FEPW].
149. In the bank-regulatory context, capital functions both as a metric of a bank’s stability and
as a tool for regulators to ensure that a bank’s loss-absorbing cushion is commensurate with its
risk profile so as to prevent the need for taxpayer bailouts. See BARR ET AL., supra note 24, at 259
(“In functional and slightly idealized terms, capital measures the amount of losses that an
institution can suffer without impairing its obligations to creditors and other claimants.”).
150. FDIC, supra note 148, at 11.
151. Id. at 13.
152. For a discussion of the OCC’s promulgation of broad preemption determinations for
national banks, see supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.
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elect to enter into third-party lending relationships.153 Like the FDIC’s
recommendations, the OCC’s bulletins and advisory letters urge
national banks originating loans on behalf of third parties to play an
active role in monitoring the quality of the loans and the behavior of
the third-party lender.154 The OCC additionally promulgated rules
providing that, when the OCC determines that it must conduct an
investigation into a bank’s third-party relationship, that bank must pay
the assessment of special examination fees.155 The OCC went so far as
to put rent-a-charter parties on notice in 2000 by warning that they
“should not assume that the benefits of a bank charter, particularly with
respect to the application of state and local law, would be available to
them.”156
A bank’s primary regulatory supervisor exerts considerable
influence over its operations in ways that few regulatory entities can
claim vis-à-vis most third-party lenders by providing general guidance
about best practices alongside the omnipresent threat of informal and
formal enforcement processes. By virtue of this influence, loans
originated through third-party relationships in which the bank assumes
a substantive role in the lending with a continued economic interest in
the loans are likely to be more compliant with fundamental principles
of bank risk management and consumer protection.
D. Benefits over a Statutory Approach
It may be said that courts are inappropriate actors to eradicate
these sham transactions. But unlike a legislative approach, the inherent
agility of the true lender doctrine as applied by courts will ensure that
the effort retains teeth. Even if meaningful legislation is enacted, free
from loopholes that undermine its efficacy, a statutory approach

153. See OCC, OCC BULL. NO. 2013-29, THIRD-PARTY RELATIONSHIP (2013),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2013/bulletin-2013-29.html [https://perma.cc/
VE29-JEGA] (warning of the risks to banks posed by third-party relationships in the absence of
adequate ex ante due diligence in conjunction with ongoing monitoring of the third party’s
behavior); OCC, ADVISORY LETTER 2000–10 ON PAYDAY LENDING (2000) (“Such third-party
arrangements significantly increase risks to the bank and the OCC’s supervisory concerns.”)
[hereinafter OCC, ADVISORY LETTER].
154. Id.
155. See 12 C.F.R. § 8.6 (2018) (providing for the assessment of additional supervisory fees
against the bank to cover the cost of investigations “if the OCC determines that assessment of the
fee is warranted . . . because of the high risk or unusual nature of the activities performed” by the
third party).
156. OCC, ADVISORY LETTER, supra note 153.
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cannot adequately anticipate innovations in rent-a-charter
arrangements.
The saga of the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
(HOEPA) is instructive here.157 The legislation targeted subprimemortgage lending in light of reports of increasingly abusive home
lending practices.158 It increased disclosure requirements at the point
of origination, imposed statutory damages against lenders for
violations, and created liability for entities that subsequently purchase
subprime mortgages that do not conform to HOEPA’s standards.159
But the static nature of the statute meant that “lenders could easily
evade HOEPA’s restrictions by structuring loans to fall just below
HOEPA’s bright line, high thresholds.”160
Here, however, the dynamic quality of the true lender doctrine—
and the courts’ ability to animate it—is uniquely positioned to avoid
the kinds of shortcomings displayed by legislative efforts like HOEPA.
A judicial doctrine that is capable of identifying the real incentives of
the parties without regard to the obfuscating names or forms they
employ is likely to be considerably more effective than targeting
legislation which sets forth discrete floors or ceilings which can be
easily evaded by nonbank lenders.161 That the doctrine relies heavily
on a fact-intensive, totality-of-the-circumstances analysis militates
strongly in favor of a judicial approach, inherently more capable of
adjudicating arrangements on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, the
nontheoretical contours of this test have yet to be delineated precisely,
owing principally to the small number of cases resolved on the merits.
Courts are the most competent institution to mold the shape of the
doctrine when parties invariably begin to alter their arrangements to
avoid legal risk. To be sure, the arrangement at issue in CashCall

157. Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, Subtitle B of Title I of the Riegle
Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108
Stat. 2190 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
158. BARR ET AL., supra note 24, at 593.
159. Id.
160. Id. Additionally, by the time HOEPA was enacted, the mortgage industry had
successfully lobbied for the inclusion of a series of carve-outs, the largest of which removed
purchase mortgages—that is, “first mortgages”—from its ambit entirely. Id. As even a casual
observer of the financial crisis of 2008 would surmise, the statute did not effectively curtail abuse
in the subprime mortgage market. See id. (explaining that between 2004 and 2011, the act applied
to less than one half of one percent of all nonpurchase mortgages).
161. Congress could, of course, codify the basic principles of the true lender doctrine. But the
fact-bound application of such a statute is certain to rest, at some level of review, with the courts—
where the doctrine already exists.
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presented perhaps the most clear-cut form of a sham transaction: the
parties employed a relationship blatantly designed to bypass interestrate limits. If this type of transaction represented the final attempt by
rent-a-charter participants to create a sham transaction, Congress
could draft a statute to effectively dispose of the phenomenon by
proscribing the structure presented in that case. But rent-a-charter
parties will invariably tweak their structure162 in pursuit of the same
end—an end run around state consumer-protection laws—with only
minimal reallocation of lending risk. Accordingly, the incremental
method of the common law, guided by continual judicial appraisals of
the impact on parties of the most recent judicial application of the
doctrine, is well positioned to define the metes and bounds of the
doctrine.
It is true, of course, that such an approach will involve an element
of uncertainty on the part of rent-a-charter participants. But this
uncertainty is clearly different in scope and kind from that generated
by the Madden decision. The true lender test specifically targets actors
entering into bank partnerships with the intent to evade state interest
rate limitations and other consumer-protection laws, a group that can
be fairly charged with an awareness that their activities are afield of
any kind of safe harbor. Moreover, the uncertainty faced by rent-acharter parties is no different from any common law doctrine whose
deployment is necessarily a fact-intensive endeavor. Like a finding of
unclean hands or lack of good faith, courts can only identify the true
lender on the basis of all the facts before them, and parties seeking to
structure their behavior accordingly must do so by analogy to
adjudicated cases.163
Additionally, banking regulation should be fundamentally
conceptualized as a tradeoff. As Professor Howell Jackson explains:
The premise . . . is that an entity should not be allowed to engage in
the business of banking unless the entity complies with the regulatory

162. For a discussion of measures that rent-a-charter parties are presently considering to
avoid a finding that the third party is the true lender, see infra Part III.C.2.
163. Some practitioners in the FinTech area have noted that the true lender jurisprudence
provides ample guidance for more legitimate nonbank lenders. See, e.g., Chris Bruce, Appeals
Court May Tackle ‘True Lender’ Debate Affecting Fintechs, Online Lenders, BLOOMBERG L.:
BANKING (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.bna.com/appeals-court-may-n57982085931 [https://
perma.cc/48LK-MBQW] (quoting a partner at Goodwin Procter who believes that the test from
CashCall “can be helpful because it provides a little bit of a roadmap,” adding that “[t]he
predominant economic interest test is a higher-bar test for bank partnerships, but one that bank
partnerships can satisfy”).
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safeguards designed to restrain the risks associated with depository
institutions and also presumably complies with the social obligations
and political constraints imposed on the banking industry.164

This conception of banking helps to explain the asymmetrical
relationship between banks and their regulators, for which there is no
analogue in the relationships between other industries and their
regulators. Indeed, it is this same justification on which financial
regulators base their imposition of a variety of regulatory mechanisms
whose precise form is purposely unclear ex ante. For instance, the
precise inputs and formula for the Federal Reserve’s annual stresstesting processes165 remain generally opaque.166 This lack of
transparency, while bitterly opposed by banks, is defended on grounds
that it is necessary to prevent banks from gaming the models so as to
appear more financially healthy than they actually are.167
As with any other condition on the business of banking, the
uncertainty faced by banks who elect to enter into third-party lending
relationships as a result of an under-defined true lender doctrine is
simply an extension of this logic: an unavoidable restraint on the risks
associated with those institutions who have been permitted to engage
in the business of banking.
Finally, even if the true lender doctrine was amenable to
distillation by statute or rulemaking, any push to achieve this end will
invariably run headlong into a federal government that is openly
hostile to financial regulation. Clearly, the current administration,
Congress, and the CFPB are each motivated and well-positioned either
to eliminate consumer-financial regulations or to reduce the
164. Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An
Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 319, 368 (1999). A more contemporary example of this view
is found throughout the OCC’s white paper exploring the grant of a limited charter for
marketplace lenders. See OCC, supra note 14, at 1 (“[I]f [the OCC] decide[s] to grant a national
charter to a particular fintech company, that institution will be held to the same high standards of
safety and soundness, fair access, and fair treatment of customers that all federally chartered
institutions must meet.”).
165. Stress testing refers to two processes—Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review, and
the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Tests, both of which are accomplished by the Federal Reserve—in
which the financial health of the largest bank holding companies is evaluated based on how their
balance sheets would fare when subjected to varying degrees of adverse economic conditions. See
BARR ET AL., supra note 24, at 308–12 (explaining the impetus, rationale, and operation of stress
testing).
166. See id. at 313 (noting criticism of the confidentiality of stress-testing models and
assumptions).
167. See id. (explaining that the Federal Reserves’ rationale for declining to disclose detailed
assumptions and model inputs is to prevent banks from gaming the models).
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enforcement of extant consumer-financial laws. President Donald
Trump has advocated for the repeal of Dodd-Frank both as a
candidate168 and as president,169 and his administration reportedly
considered “making a high-profile run on the [CFPB],” but decided
against that path after polling data revealed an agency “too popular to
pick a public fight with.”170
In November of 2017, however, President Trump was finally able
to begin remaking the CFPB by appointing Mick Mulvaney—whose
avowed beliefs are inimical to the CFPB171—to be the acting director
of the agency that had secured the most full-throated judicial
endorsement of the true lender doctrine to date.172 Since leading the
CFPB, Mulvaney has halted rulemaking, imposed a freeze on new
enforcement actions, and actively lobbied legislators to pursue
congressional invalidation of a CFPB rule governing short-term
lending that was promulgated before Mulvaney arrived.173
Meanwhile, the only real question in Congress is which version of
financial deregulatory reform will garner enough support to become

168. See Emily Flitter & Steve Holland, Trump Preparing Plan to Dismantle Obama’s Wall
Street Reform Law, REUTERS (May 17, 2016, 8:14 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usaelection-trump-banks/trump-preparing-plan-to-dismantle-obamas-wall-street-reform-lawidUSKCN0Y900J [https://perma.cc/9YXC-EMLU] (reporting on then-candidate Trump’s plan to
repeal Dodd-Frank).
169. See Benjamin Bain & Jesse Hamilton, Trump Pledges ‘Big Number’ on Dodd-Frank in
Anti-Rule Push, BLOOMBERG POLITICS (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-01-30/trump-pledges-big-number-on-dodd-frank-in-anti-regulatory-push [https://
perma.cc/62J2-XFX3] (quoting President Trump’s promise “to do a big number on DoddFrank”).
170. Steve Eder, Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Stacy Cowley, Republicans Want To Sideline
This Regulator. But It May Be Too Popular., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/31/business/consumer-financial-protection-bureau.html
[https://perma.cc/W75S-E4GS].
171. See Renae Merle, The CFPB Now Has Two Acting Directors. And Nobody Knows Which
One Should Lead the Federal Agency, WASH. POST (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2017/11/24/the-cfpb-now-has-two-acting-directors-andnobody-knows-which-one-should-lead-the-federal-agency/?utm_term=.1dcfccc520f4
[https://perma.cc/H32C-JDKH] (“Trump proposed his White House budget director, Mick
Mulvaney, as the acting director of the CFPB, which Mulvaney once called a ‘joke’ and said he
wished didn’t exist.”).
172. For a review of CashCall, Inc., see supra notes 127–35 and accompanying text.
173. See Ian McKendry, Mulvaney’s First Days at CFPB: Payday, Personnel and a Prank, AM.
BANKER (Dec. 4, 2017, 8:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/cfpbs-mulvaney-backscongressional-repeal-of-payday-lending-rule
[https://perma.cc/Z8MH-PG9R]
(detailing
Mulvaney’s actions in the initial weeks of his CFPB tenure).
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law: the House’s extreme Financial CHOICE Act,174 passed by the
House in June 2017 along party lines, or a more moderate bipartisan
bill making its way through the Senate.175 Even if the current CFPB
leadership resumed the operation of the bureau consistent with its
mission, this Congress has displayed a clear desire to exercise any
controls at its disposal to block the proliferation of consumer-financial
regulation.176 With a president, Congress, and the CFPB intent on
achieving a decrease in financial regulation and associated
enforcement, any suggestion that a statutory or administrative
approach is preferable to the true lender doctrine is not generally
tenable.
CONCLUSION
The modern scope of the exportation doctrine bears little
relationship to its historical justification. Moreover, the exigencies of
consumer protection and the mitigation of future financial crises
militate strongly in favor of the doctrine’s curtailment. Nonbank
entities, at minimum, should not be allowed the benefit of the doctrine
by temporarily occupying banks for the sole purpose of originating
loans that are immune from state financial-consumer-protection laws.
The experience of the Madden ruling cautions strongly against a blunt,
overly broad ruling, while the inefficacy of HOEPA weighs against
legislation that may prove unresponsive or watered down upon its
enactment. The true lender doctrine’s singular focus on substance over
form, combined with judicial agility to examine each factual
constellation and detect any obfuscating formalities implemented by
rent-a-charter parties, is presently the most effective way to sensibly
limit the reach of the exportation doctrine. And, to the degree that
banks assume more substantive duties in the lending process and retain
some measure of risk in seeking to comply with the doctrine, the results
174. Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (as passed by House, June 8, 2017).
Transparently hostile to consumer financial protection, the CHOICE Act forbids the CFPB from
even maintaining a database of complaints received from consumers, id. § 724, and completely
eliminates the agency’s authority to proscribe unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices by
depository institutions, id. § 735.
175. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, S. 2155, 115th
Cong. (as reported by S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, Dec. 18, 2017).
176. See Joint Resolution Providing for Congressional Disapproval Under Chapter 8 of Title
5, United States Code, of the Rule Submitted by Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection
Relating to “Arbitration Agreements,” Pub. L. No. 115-74, 131 Stat. 1243 (2017) (invalidating the
CFPB’s consumer-financial arbitration rule that had been promulgated pursuant to express
authorization of Dodd-Frank).
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are broadly consistent with regulatory approaches that have been
deployed in the wake of the financial crisis.

